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REVIEW OF HYDROGEN ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS IN NASA OPERATIONS
by Paul M• Ordin
Lewis Research Center
ABSTRACT
The report reviews a number of the accidents/incldenrs with hydrogen
in NASA operations. The cause factors for the mishaps are reviewed end
show that although few accidents occurred, the number could have been fur-
' ther reduced if the established NASA rules and regulations had been fol-
%: ' lowed. Requirement8 for effective safety codes and areas of study for
-_ , hydrogen safety information are included. The report concludes with a
compilation of 96 hydrogen mishaps; a description of the accidents and
their causes.
INTRODUCTION
: The national concern over the growing energy crisis and environmental
pollution has resulted in the consideration of hydrogen as a suitable fuel
c_ for future use Hydrogen is readily produced from water by electrolysis,
' i and designs have been proposed in which nuclear and solar power sys_.emsfu
" would provide the energy for producing the hydrogen efficiently. One ad-
vantage of using hydrogen is increased efficlencles in energy conversion
devices over those obtained with hydrocarbon fuels.
Studies have shown that it is possible to produce liquid hydrogen at
costs that would be competitive with those of other fuels, Howeverp the
avai)ability and economics of a large liquid hydzogen supply are still a
• very important factor in the overall concept of a hydrogen economy. The
second major factor in the development of a hydrogen economy is safety.
_ What are the safety problems in the production, handling, transportation,
and use of liquid and gaseous hydrogen? The purpose of this paper is to
" _ provide information on the overall safety _f hydzogen by reviewing records
• of accidents and incidents which have ocr.urred in the development and op-
eration of NASA's propulsion and power systems.
• This ,-ompllation of 96 mishaps serves not only to provide a general
- concept of the possible hazards in the handling end use of hydrogen but
identifies significant lessons learned from these experiences. The
records reviewed were primarily from NASA centers, These records de-
scribed the mishaps and their causes and in many instances included reoom-
mended preventive or corrective actions A number were obtained from con-
'- tractors involved in the development of the chemical and nuclear propul-
-- sion systems.
Areas of research .md development are suggested for _ncreased safety
.- and for the development of techniques to reduce the consequences of any
mishaps•
o
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....- Hydrogen is used principally as a propellant for propulsion. The
_: _ Centaur stage and the second and third stages of the Saturn launch
:: vehicle utilize the liquid hydrogen - liquid oxygen propellant combina-
ble,. tion_ The fuel-tank capacity of the Centaur sta_e is 38 cubic meters
....=,_. (i0 000 gel). The Saturn's first stage has a 1021 cubic meter
_? (270 000 gal) capacity and the second stage a 276 cubic-meter (73 000 gal)
_; capacity.
Large quantities of )iquid hydrogen are stored and used at NASA and-
contractor facilities. Tanks with storage capacities of over 3213 cubic
meters (850 000 gal) exist at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). Approxi- °
i_: mately 7600 cubic meters (2 million gal) of liquid hydrogen storage was
available at the nuclear rocket test facility. Liquid hydrogen is trans-
. ported from the manufacturer to the various NASA and contractor facili-
>' ties in over-the-road tanker trailers designed to contain from Ii to
: 61 cubic meters (3000 to 16 000 gal) and in railroad cars having a maxi-
_ mum capacity of 129 cubic meters (34 000 gal). Each t_nker trailer for
the transportation of liquid hydrogen requires a special permit from the
Department of Transportation (DOT). The Code of Federal Regulations in-
: cludes _he detailed requirements for railroad transrcrtation.
In the Apollo-Saturn program alone, the KSC tanker trailers hauled
over 16 million gallons of liquid hydrogen. Liquid hydrogen was also
transported by barge to the Mississippi Test Facility. These barges have
a capacity of 950 cubic meters (250 000 gal) and use vacuum perllte insu-
i_i lation to keep the boiloff below 0.15 percent per day. Liquid hydrogen
was transferred from the barges to the test vehicle tanks or storage
: tanks at rates of about 38 m3/mln (i0 000 gal/min) through 25.4-centimeter
_ (10-in.) diameter vacuum-jacketed lines. The barge operations were con-
- ducted in special canals in which the level changes of a barge during
loading and unloading were controlled, as well as in canals which w_re
! subjected to tidal conditions.
_-- _ The experience with hydrogen in NASA and AEC operations has been ex-
tremely gratifying in that relatively few accidents have occurred. We
_. attribute this to comprehensive cryogenic and hydrogen safety programs
practiced at the various facilities. For the most part, mishaps occurred
_. when the guidelines and prescribed procedures included in the safety pro-
grams were neglected.
.. CAUSES OF MISHAPS
The causal factors which contributed to the mlsnaps detailed in the
appendix have been categorized as follow:
(J) Procedural defi<iencles: the failure to follow established pro-
cedures or to prepare proper procedures
(2) Planning deficiencies: limited planning, such as failures to
prepare test pa_ o, to perform hazard studies
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(3) Mate.rials failures: the failure of materials and components due
to stresses which had been considered witbln the design limits
(4) Design deficiencies: inadequate componez:t or system designs,
including failure to specify safety devices and omission of other
essential information, failure to determine stress and fatigue,
errors in material selection (such as clerical errors in drawings
and specifications)
(5) Operation and work area deficiencies: inadequate working condi-
tions during installation, maintenance, fabrication, and cleaning
and the lack of training and/or specific instructions
(6) Malfunctlon: any anomaly, including components in the system
. which failed to function as intended
(7) Materials incompat.lbillty: incompatible materials either brought
together by accident or designed into the system
(8) Contamination: the use of contaminated m_terlal
The distrlb%_tion of the mishaps according to these general categories
of causal factors is shown in figure i. The 96 mishaps listed in the
appendix were used to establlsh the distribution shown in this and fol-
lowing flgures_ In a numbs= of cases, more than one factor was considered
as being responsible for the mishap.
_ The largest number of mishaps (26 percent) was considered to be
caused by work area deficiencies. Procedural deficiencies accounted for
25 percent. Design deficiencies were responsible for 22 percent. Plan-
ning deficiencies followed next with 14 percent. These four categories,
:_ which are basic to an overview of safety requirements for any type of
_ engineering system, were responsible for 87 percent of the mishaps re-
viewed. Malfunctions were involved In about 8 percent of the accidents,
while problems concerned wlth materials failures and materials incompati-
_ bilitles were each factors in about 3 pezcent of the mishaps.
.... . An effort was made to identify the hardware, equipment, or specific
.... action directly responsible for each accldent. These results are shown
in figure 2.
• Valve malfunctions and/o_ valve leaks w_re conslde_ed as being re-
_ sponsible for 20 percent of the mlshaps_ These valve malfunctions and
: leaks, as well as a numbe_ of the other speclflc causes of mishaps, were
._ due primarily to operational (work aTea), p_ocedural, and design deli-
a'" ciencies, For example, valve n_Ifunctlons and valve leaks were caused by
(I) Not following the established p_ocedure in applying correct
_ . pressures
._#
_<_ (2) Not carrying out the pu_ging proce,_ures as plescrlbed in the
. operational requirements
_ 4
_ (3) Not opening or closing the proper valves in the system as indi-
cated in the design specifications
On several occasions, the valve design or the materials used in construc-
..... tion caused the malfunction or leak. Leaking connections and/or fittings
were identified as being separate from valve leaks and caused about
: 16 percent of the mishaps. Items such as loose flange connections caused
shrinkage of the "0" rings and/or gaskets because of the low temperature
" and resulted in leaks that caased mishaps. Fittings not installed prop-
erly also resulted in leaks that caused accidents. To a large extent,
not following established procedures, or the lack of specific instruc-
tions were responsible for the leaking connections.
. Safety disk failures, materials failures, and high venting rates
were each identified as responsible for about ii percent of the mishaps.
- Safety disk failures in tank and piping installations and in over-the-
road tanker trailers caused leaks which were responsible for some of the
" accidents. A number of the disk failures were considered as malfunctions;
._ however, in several instances, improper installation and failure to fol-
low established planning for the replacement of ruptured disks caused the
failure. In most instances, the disk performed as designed and ruptured
when the design pressure was attained. The rupture did, however, release
hydrogen and, in some instances, caused an accident.
Liquid hydrogen can decrease the ductility and impact resistance of
•- structural materials with which it comes in contact. The use of materials
not compatible with hydrogen caused a number of mishaps. In some in-
stances the design did not fully consider the wide range of coefficients
of expansion of the materials used and the degree of confinement of these
materials required to limit the development of high stresses. Hydrogen
embrittlement of materials was also a factor in a number of the accidents.
High venting rates of hydrogen through venting systems were consid-
_ e_ed as being responsible for a number of the mishaps. _te problem re-
_ lated to these high venting rates, which to a large extent were due to
system design limitations, was the ignition of hydrogen-elf mixtures. It
_ appears that, with high venting rates, ignition t_nds to occur more fre-
" quently above the vent stack, around the vehicle stage platform area, or
above the tank testing area. High venting rates during weather condi-
tions which limited the dispersion of hydrogen appear to be responsible
for providing easily ignitible hydrogen-air mixtures.
" Cryopumplng has been identified as being involved in about i0 per-
cent of the mishaps. In a numoe_ of instances, the cooling of vessels
and lines produced a reduced-pru3sure envlrcnment that resulted in air
being sucked into the system. Air entered through leaks or faulty valves.
: Incomplete facility construction and unsatisfactory _rocedures also el-
• lowed air to enter the _ysrem, The air formed flammable mixtures with
hyd_ob_,_ and occasi_nall> ignlte_ _r, in several instances, liquefied (or
• solidified) and formed flammable hydrogen-air mixtures during the warmup
_. phase of the operations. The Ignition cf surh mixtures under these con_
1974020344-TSA06
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ditions usually resulted in explosions or detonations. Mishaps caused by
the llquefaction of air were also included in the cryopumping category.
Air llquefles and forms a running stream when directly exposed to tanks
and piping containing liquid hydrogen. In a number of tests, the liquid
air was not directed away from major pieces of equipment and caused some !
failures that resulted in hydrogen leaks and fires.
The mishaps attributed to air in the system caused about 5 percent
of the accidents. These included mishaps in which work with hydrogen was
initiated or repairs were performed in hydrogen systems without the sys-
tem or equipment being properly purged. The flammable hydrogen-air mix-
tures within the system components, such as tanks and lines, usually ex-
ploded when an ignition source was available. I_ a number of such in-
stances, drilling, cutting, or welding operations provided the ignition
. source. Also included in figure 2 are bellows failures_ which usually
occurred in liquld hydrogen llnes. The release of hydrogen most fre-
quently resulted in fires. System overpressurization and installation
errors were responsible for a large number of the bellows ruptures, which
resulted in 4 percent of the mishaps. Several of the accidents were
caused by battery operations (about 4 percent) in which hydrogen-elf mix-
tures formed and ignited. In general, the lack of purging or ventilation
was responsible for the buildup of the flammable mixtures. Highway acci-
dents accounted for about 4 percent of the total mishaps included in the
appe_di_. The other identified causes, which each resulted in less than
3 percent of the mishaps, included tank and llne ruptures and vacuum
losses.
In a number of accidents, the released hydrogen did not ignite.
T_ble I presents a summary of the results of the mishaps with respect to
where the release occurred and whether the hydrogen-alr mixtures ignited.
A total of 80 (83 percent) of the mishaps involved s release of liquid end/or
gaseou_ hydrogen. The hydrogen was considered as being released to the
atmosphere or within an enclosure such as a tank or llne. In general,
when the hydrogen was released within an enclosure, the enclosure con-
tained a= air environment, acd a hydrogen-air flammable mixture resulted
immediately. About 69 percent of the mishaps (.56) involved a release of
hydrogen to the atmosphere, and 21 percent involved release to enclosures.
_ . In six mishaps, hydrogen was considered as being released to both loca-
tions.
• When hydrogen was released to the atmosphere, ignition of the mix-
ture occurred 62 percent of the time (41 mishaps); and for release to en-
closures, ignition oncurred each time (20 mishaps). The available acci-
dent reports were reviewed to determine the source of ignition, and the
results are shown in figure 3. In 30 percent of the mishaps in which
hydrogen was released and ignition occurred, the source of ignition was
not known. Electric short circuits and sparking were considered to be
responsible for 24 percent of the ignitions and static charges for about
17 percent. For about 7 percent of the releases, the source of ignition
was believed to be the flare on the vent stack. Use of welding or cut-
ting torches, metal fracture, and impingement of bJgh-veloclty gases were
'" .... ' .........  1974020344-TSA07
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Ignition of hydrogen-air mixtures attributed to me_.al fracture involved
tensile testing mishaps in which the fracturing of the specimens provided
the ignition source. Also included are mishaps in which the cause of ig-
"- nition was considered to be burst safety disks or metal failures. The
specific ignition source was probably the static charges or hot spots
that developed during material rupture. IEnltions attributed to impact
include those considered to be caused by high-velocity fragments.
" The importance of satisfactorily purging a system before any opera-
i tions with hydrogen is demonstrated by the data presented in table II.
The misl_ps weze reviewed with respect to the release of hydrogen, the
ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture, and the role of possible purging
problems. Of the total number of mishaps (96) 25 percent were associated
with a purging problem ; that is, the system was not purged as prescribed
_ nor was the exit gas analyzed to ensu_'e the removal of air. Such purging
problems resulted in the release of hydrogen to the atmosphere (14 acci-
: dents (58 percent)) and in release within the system (i0 accidents
(42 percent)). Of those mishaps involving a re_ease of hydrogen to the
atmosphere, 93 percent resulted in ignition. Ignition occurred for all
those mishaps in which hydrogen was released into the system. Various
• purging procedures are recommended and operational methods defined, but
.. It appears that more positive means must be made available to ensure com-
pliance with the requirements.
_- The causes of hydrogen tanker trailer mishaps are summarized in fig--
_ ure 4. Seventeen tanker trailer mis|mps were included in the study with
71 percent (12) associated with off-loadlng operations (usually at the
_ test facility) and 29 percent (5) occurring on the highway. In about
: _. 92 percent of the off-loading accidents (ii), hydrogen was released, bu_
in only 27 percent (3) did ignition take place. With respoct to highway
mishaps, 60 percent (3) involved a release of hydrogen, hut no ignitions
occurred. For both the off-loading and highway mishaps, disk rupture ,;as
the principal cause _ other cause_, Included open or leaking safety valves
_i. (18 percent), loose couplings, vacuum failures, and vent valve leaks. In
several instances, positioning the trailer in preparation for connecting
"-_ lines resulted in the driver hitting parts of the facility.
The safety record of o_er-the-road transportation of liquid hydrogen
- is quite evident in that only five tanker trailer highway accidents a::e
included. These reports involved NASA operations. In three of these ac-
-- cidents the tractor was heavily damaged, but the trailer remained sub-
stantially sound. There was no damage in the other two highway accidents.
...... In only one case was liquid hydrogen spilled on the ground, and there was
no ignition of the hydrogen-alr mixture.
The results of this review indicate relatively few accidents involv-
ing hydrogen during the development and operation of the NASA propulsLon
systems. This number could have been reduced considerably if the est4tb-
fished rules and regulations had been carefully followed. Comprehens:.ve
hydrogen safety programs, includlt_g detailed safety codes, must be
1974020344-TSA08
7evolved for each system. As with the NASA guidelines, these safety and
operational codes must be based on the following factors:
(1) Kno-._ledgeof the potential hazards of hydrogen
(2) System engineering to preclude hazards
(3) Personnel education in both the potential hazards and technical
knowledge of the system
(4) Assurance that specific safety procedures exist and are followed
, for each operation
These factors demand that, to be effective, safety codes must be
. based on knowledge of the properties of both the fluids (14quid gases and
mixtures) and the materials used to confine them. The systems safety con-
cept requires a technical management discipline covering conceptual and
design studies, engineering, testing, fabrication, and operation of each
system. At least one level of fail-safe redundancy should be provided
for all subsystems and components Judged to be critical or catastrophic.
It is important that all supervisory and technical personnel working on a
system have an intimate knowledge of the equipment arrangement, facili-
ties, and system operations. Strict discipline must be maintained
throughout all phases of testing, and procedures regulating each step of
the operation are mandatory.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since many of the accident reports on which this review was based
did not contain sufficiently detailed technical description6 of the mis-
haps or were not specific as to the hardware and/or operating procedures
involved, efforts are underway to modify the reporting procedures to In-
clude such information. The records do, however, indicate a very high
level of safety with hydrogen. The solution to many of the problems can
_. positively be prescribed, but further research and development would be
required for answers to others. Some of those areas in which studies
• should be performed include the following:
i
(i) Means to ensure positive removal of air during purging
(2) Studies of maximum possible disposal rates and how these rates
would be modified by the existing weather ronditions
(3) Development of easy and rapid means of detecting any initiation
of cryopumping which could promote hydrogen-air mixture
(4) Development of standards and specifications for liquid hydrogen
valves, fittings, and connections wlth respect to leakagere-
quirements
" ' 1974020344-TSA09
:_ (5) An improved ,,aderstanding of the possible sources of ignition of
, the hydrogen-air mixture and means for eliminating them
_ (6) The development of highway driving guidelines with respect to
road and environmental conditions
_- (7) Means of limiting flammable mixtures such as restricting vent
pointsp adequate ventilationp inerting systems, and installing
monitoring devices around suspected leak points
!
.....
I
!
'...... I
!
I
1.CI74NgN_A.A_T_ A ,In
1974020344-TSA11
II
P
<=
, _ _
i
Figure1. - Generaldistributionofcausesofmis-
hapswithhydrogen- (morethanonecausefac-
toris involvedwithmostmishaps).
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Floure2, - DetaildistributionofcausesofmishapsIn whichhydrogenwasre-
leased(morethanonecausefactoris Involvedwithsomemishaps).
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Figure 3. - Ignitionsources- mishapsinvolv-
Ing releaseof hydrogen.
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Figure 4, - Liqutdhydr_en trailer accidents.
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